Golub v. Kirk-Scott, LTD Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 41505 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
4-18-2014
Golub v. Kirk-Scott, LTD Respondent's Brief Dckt.
41505
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Golub v. Kirk-Scott, LTD Respondent's Brief Dckt. 41505" (2014). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 4823.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/4823
No. 41505-2013 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
ALAN GOLUB and MARILYN GOLUB, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Respondents 
vs. 
KIRK-SCOTT, LTD, a Texas corporation; KIRK-HUGHES 
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; GERALDINE 
KIRK-HUGHES and PETER SAMPSON, husband and wife; KIRK-
HUGHES & ASSOCIATES, INC., a Nevada corporation; 
Defendants/Appellants 
and 
KELL Y POLA TIS, an individual, and DELANO D. and LENORE 1. 
PETERSON, husband and wife; INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE; 
TOMLINSON NORTH IDAHO, INC., an Idaho corporation, 
Defendants 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai 
MATTHEW Z. CROTTY 
CROTTY & SON, PLLC 
421 W. Riverside, Suite 1005 
Spokane, Washington 99201 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Kirk-Scott, LTD 
MICHAEL T. HOWARD 
WINSTON & CASHATT, LAWYERS 
250 Northwest Blvd., Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Attorneys for Respondent 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF TI~IE CASE ...................................................................................................... 1 
A. Nature of the case/introduction ............................................................................... 1 
B. Facts. . .......................................................................................................... 2 
C. Course of proceedings ............................................................................................. 5 
ARGUMEN'[ ........................................................................................................... 6 
A. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to vacate a default 
judgment entered over four years before the motion was made .............................. 7 
1. Rule 60(b) requires the moving party to prove the motion was brought 
within "a reasonable time"; Kirk-Scott failed to meet its burden to 
establish such reasonableness, including proof of when it became aware 
of the judgment. ............................................................................................ 8 
2. A non-party to the judgment sought to be vacated is also required to 
establish timeliness ..................................................................................... 11 
3. While it is not Golub's burden to establish timelines, the only facts before 
the court demonstrate that Kirk-Scott did not act timely ............................ 12 
B. Even if the court were to address additional merits of the motion to vacate the 
default judgment, which was rendered unnecessary by the failure of Kirk-Scott 
to establish timeliness, no basis exists to void the judgment. ............................... 14 
1. The Complaint and course of proceedings adequately established the 
amount of the judgment. ............................................................................. 14 
2. No basis existed under Rule 60(b)(5) or (6) to vacate ................................ 18 
C. The trial court properly granted summary judgment on the undisputed facts 
which established that Golub's Judgment had priority over all other interests ..... 19 
1. Golub's judgment lien need not be supported by good faith or additional 
consideration to establish priority ............................................................... 19 
2. While not necessary, the undisputed facts established that Golub had no 
knowledge of Kirk-Scott's unrecorded Deed of Trust for "good faith" 
purposes ...................................................................................................... 24 
3. Golub's judgment lien is valid .................................................................... 30 
D. The court properly found that Kirk-Scott's recording was invalid based on 
lack of acknowledgement and because it was filed in violation of the 
bankruptcy stay as a matter oflaw ........................................................................ 32 
1. Kirk-Scott's September 17,2010 recording is invalid because the Deed 
of Trust was not properly acknowledged or certified under Idaho or 
Nevada law. . .............................................................................................. 32 
2. Golub had standing to object to recordation of Kirk-Scott's deed of trust 
during bankruptcy stay .............................................................................. 35 
E. Idaho law does not provide for a reduction in judgment based on the settlement 
paid by a co-defendant. ......................................................................................... 36 
F. The court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning the Appellants for an 
improperly brought motion ................................................................................... 37 
G. Attorney fees are not recoverable .......................................................................... 40 
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................... 40 
11 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
Blanc v. Laritz, 119 Idaho 359,806 P.2d 452 (Ct. App. 1991) ...................................... 11, 12 
Burns v. Baldwin, 138 Idaho 480, 65 P.3d 502 (2003) ............................................................. 11 
Catledge v. Tramport Tire Co., 107 Idaho 602, 691 P .2d 1217 (1984) ........................................ 9 
Credit Bureau v. 5'leight, 92 Idaho 210, 440 P.2d 143 (1968) ..................................................... 34 
Cuevas v. Barraza, 152 Idaho 890, 277 P.3d 337 (2012) ............................................................ 14 
Davis v. Parrish, 131 Idaho 595, 961 P.2d 1198 (1998) ............................................................... 9 
Dawson v. Cheyovich Family Trust, 149 Idaho 375, 234 P.3d 699 (2010) ................................. 13 
Dillon v. MontgomelY, 138 Idaho 614, 67 P.3d 93 (2003) .......................................................... 17 
Duetz-Allis Credit COlp. v. Smith, 117 Idaho 118, 785 P.2d 682 (Ct.App. 1990) ......................... 7 
EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002) ...................................................................... 36 
First Sec. Bank of Idaho, N.A. v. Stauffer, 112 Idaho 133,730 P.2d 1053 (Ct.App. 1986) .......... 9 
Gracie, LLC v. Idaho State Tax Com'n., 149 Idaho 570, 237 P.3d 1196 (2010) ......................... 19 
Gunter v. A1urphy's Lounge, LLC, 141 Idaho 16, 105 P.3d 676 (2005) ...................................... 36 
Hartman v. United Heritage Property & Casualty Co., 141 Idaho 193, 108 P.3d 340 (2005) ... 14 
Idah-Best, Inc. v. First Security Bank of Idaho, 99 Idaho 517, 584 P.2d 1242 (1978) ................ 31 
in re Brooks, 79 BR. 479 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1987) ......................................................................... 35 
In re Estate of Bagley, 117 Idaho 1091, 793 P.2d 1263 (Ct. App. 1990) .................................... 19 
In re Ellis, 441 B.R. 656 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2010) ........................................................................ 35 
In re franck, 171 B.R. 893 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1994) .................................................................... 36 
In re Fuel Oil Supply and Terminaling, Inc., 30 BR. 360 (N.D. Tex. 1983) .............................. 35 
In re Hegel, 2000 WL 33712298 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2000) ........................................................... 35 
In re Jane Doe I, 145 Idaho 650, 182 P .3d 707 (2008) ................................................................. 7 
In re Schwartz, 954 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1992) .............................................................................. 35 
In re Stivers. 31 B.R. 735 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1983) ..................................................................... 35 
Insight, LLC v. Gunter, 2013 WL 1730149 (Idaho 2013) ..................................................... 27, 29 
Johnson v. Pioneer Title Co., 104 Idaho 727, 662 P .2d 1171 (Ct. App. 1983) ..................... 10, 15 
Johnson v. Har(lord, 99 Idaho 134, 578 P.2d 676 (1978) ........................................................... 15 
Kiebert v. Goss, 144 Idaho 225 159 P.3d 862 (2007) .................................................................. 24 
Kovachy v. DeLevsomine, 122 Idaho 973, 842 P.2d 309 (Ct.App. 1992) ................................... 10 
Landvik v. Herbert, 130 Idaho 54, 936 P.2d 54 (Ct. App. 1997) ................................................ 38 
Lester v. Salvino, 141 Idaho 937, 120 P.3d 755 (2005) .................................... "0 ......................... 39 
McGrew v. McGrew, 139 Idaho 551, 82 P.3d 833 (2003) ...................................................... 11-12 
A1eyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283,221 P.3d 81 (2009) ........................................................... 9, 18 
M&H Rentals, Inc. v. Sales, 108 Idaho 567, 700 P.2d 970 (Ct. App. 1985) ............................... 31 
klo11endorfv. Derry, 95 Idaho 1,501 P.2d 199 (1972) ............................................................... 34 
Mountain Home Lumber Co., Ltd. v. Swartout, 30 Idaho 559 (1917) ................................... 22, 23 
Printcrafi Press, Inc. v. Sunnyside Park Utilitie5', Inc., 153 Idaho 440, 283 P.3d 757 (2012) ...... 8 
III 
Robison v. Bateman Hall, 139 Idaho 207, 76 P.3d 951 (2003) .................................................. 20 
Schlie/Iv. Bistline, 52 Idaho 353,15 P.2d 726 (1932) ................................................................. 17 
Sherwood & Roberts, Inc. v. Riplinger, 103 Idaho 535, 650 P.2d 677 (1982) .............................. 7 
State v. Rivera, 131 Idaho 8, 951 P.2d 528 (Ct. App. 1998) ....................................................... 21 
State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471,163 P.3d 1183 (2007) ........................................................... 20 
Stoner v. Turner, 73 Idaho 117,247, P.2d 469 (1952) .................................................................. 9 
Sun Valley Hot Springs v. Kelsey, 131 Idaho 657, 962 P.2d 1041 (1998) ................................... 26 
United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260 (2010) .............................................. 11 
Telfordv. Nye, 154 Idaho 606, 301 P.3d 264 (2013) ................................................................... 39 
Viafax Corp. v. Stuckenbrock, 134 Idaho 65, 995 P.2d 835 (Ct. App. 2000) ........................ 11, 13 
Wright v. 'Wright, 130 Idaho 918,,950 P.2d 1257 (1998) ............................................................. 9 
STATUES AND RULES 















I.R.C.P. 59(a)(1) (6) & (7) 
I.R.C.P.60(b) 
I.R.C.P.60(b)(4) 



























STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature ofthe case/introduction. 
Alan Golub (Golub) is a real estate agent who was forced to sue, among others, Geraldine 
Kirk-Hughes ("Kirk-Hughes"), Kirk-Hughes Development ("KHD"), and Kirk-Hughes and 
Associates (collectively "the Kirk-Hughes Defendants") for damages he incurred when a real 
estate commission he was owed was not paid based on the tortious interference and fraud of 
Kirk-Hughes and her various entities. 
The Kirk-Hughes Defendants defended the case for a year and a half before Golub 
obtained a default judgment against them in March of 2009. That judgment was recorded on 
August 25, 2009. (Augmented Record, May 3, 2013 Ai! of Michael T. Howard, Ix. 8) It was 
re-recorded on October 28, 2010, as soon as KHD was out of bankruptcy. (Id.) While the 
bankruptcy of KHD was pending, and in violation of the automatic stay, Kirk-Scott Ltd. 
(Kirk-Scott), a company owned by Kirk-Hughes' sister Balinda Antoine, recorded a Deed of 
Trust on September 17,2010 against the real property owned by KHD, claiming that Kirk-Scott 
was given an interest in the property in 2004. (Augmented Record, May 3, 2013 Ai! of}vfichael 
T Howard, Ex. 5) 
Golub subsequently filed this declaratory relief action to establish that his judgment lien 
had priority over all other claims on the real property owned by the Defendants and that he was 
thus entitled to proceed with foreclosure to collect his judgment. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 28-32) 
Kirk-Scott and the Kirk-Hughes Defendants made a variety of motions and re-motions seeking to 
block Golub's priority, primarily based on attempting to vacate the underlying judgment that had 
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been rendered over SIX years before, and based on the September 2010 reeordation of 
Kirk-Scott's Deed of Trust, purportedly given in 2004. The trial court refused to vacate the 
judgment, and granted summary judgment establishing the priority of Golub's judgment lien. 
(R. Vol. I, pp. 414-421) Kirk-Scott and the Kirk-Hughes Defendants now appeal the trial court's 
appropriate exercise of discretion and application of the law. 
B. Facts. 
In 2004, Mr. Golub was a real estate agent involved in the sale of properties to a Las 
Vegas attorney and developer, Geraldine Kirk-Hughes. Kirk-Hughes sought to purchase 
properties in Kootenai County to develop a golf course and residential community called 
"Chateau de Loire" (the "Project"). The properties purchased in furtherance of the Project 
included three parcels hereinafter referred to as the "Sloan properties" (tax numbers 5000 and 
5850), the "Atkinson property" (tax number 8050), and the Peterson property. 
Kirk-Scott Ltd. is a Texas company O\vned by Kirk-Hughes's sister, Balinda Antoine. On 
July 8, 2004 Kirk-Scott purchased the Sloan properties. (Augmented Record, ,"'fay 3, 2013 Ail of 
lvlichael T Howard, r-x. 1) Three weeks later, on July 30, 2004, Kirk-Hughes' law firm, 
Kirk-Hughes Associates, purchased the Atkinson property. (Id., E.;'(, 2) Kirk-Hughes was 
assigned a Purchase and Sale Agreement on the Peterson property to acquire it for $6M; she let 
that sale lapse in October 2004, but five months later, the Peterson property was sold to 
Kirk-Hughes' business partner, Kelly Polatis, who deeded it to KHD the same day, thereby 
circumventing the large real estate commissions owed to Golub. (R. Vol. I, pp. 162-169) 
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Kirk-Hughes had formed KIlD as a separate entity to hold title to, and develop the 
properties in October 2004. Kirk-Scott is a 51.5% member in KHD: Antoine herself is a 3% 
member of KHD. (Augmented Record, lvfay 3, 2013 AI].' (~lMichael 1'. Howard, Ex:. 10, p. 23) 
Kirk-Scott transterred the Sloan properties to KIlD on November 18, 2004. That same day, 
KHD purportedly gave Kirk-Scott a Deed of Trust, listing the Sloan properties as well as the 
Atkinson property. (Augmented Record, May 3, 2013 Ail of Alichael 1'. Howard, Ex:. 5) 
(Kirk-Hughes Associates did not transfer the Atkinson property to KHD until May 12, 2005.) 
(ld, Ex:. 4) Kirk-Scott did not record the Deed of Trust at that time. 
In October 2007, Golub brought suit against Kirk-Hughes, KHD, Kirk-Hughes 
Associates and the Petersons in CV 07-8038 alleging damages arising from his unpaid realtor 
fees, which were proximately caused by the tortious interference, fraud, and conspiracy of the 
Defendants. (R. Vol. l, pp. 162-169) After defending the case for a year and a half, the 
Kirk-Hughes Defendants failed to appear following withdrawal of their attorney, and the court 
entered an Order of Default against all defendants except the Petersons. 1 On March 12,2009 the 
court entered a $941,000 judgment against the Kirk-Hughes Defendants. (Augmented Record, 
iHay 3, 2013 Ail oj' ,\'fichael 1'. Howard, ~X. 8) 




On April 6, 2009, KIlO filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy in Nevada (09-15153-mkn) and the 
automatic stay prevented any further collection eflorts against KHD. (See Augmented Record, 
/IIlay 3. 2013 Aif of Michael T H(Hvard, Ex. 9) Despite the purported $1.35M obligation to 
Kirk-Scott secured by the Deed of Trust, KHD did not list any secured claims regarding the 
property and did not list either Kirk-Scott or Balinda Antoine as a creditor on its Chapter 11 
bankruptcy schedules. (Augmented Record, May 3, 2013 Afl of Michael T Howard, Ex. 10, 
pp. 8, 12) Neither Kirk-Scott nor Antoine filed a creditor's claim. (See Augmented Record, 
lv1ay 3, 2013 Afl (~f Michael T Howard, ~9) 
On August 10, 2009 the claims against Peterson (the only remaining claims) were settled 
and dismissed and the court signed an Order of Final Judgment and 54(b) certiticate, allowing 
Golub to proceed with collection against all defendants except KHD because it was still in 
bankruptcy. (Augmented Record, May 3, 2013 AIr of Michael T Howard, Ex. 11) Golub 
recorded the judgment in Kootenai County on August 25, 2009. (See Augmented Record, A1ay 3, 
2013 Afl ~f A1ichael T Howard, Er:. 8) A year later, on September 17,2010, Kirk-Scott 
recorded a $1.35M Deed of Trust purportedly issued to it by KHD six years earlier. (See 
Augmented Record, J\1ay 3, 2013 Afl of Michael T Howard, Ex. 5) At the time the Deed of 
Trust was recorded, KHD was still in bankruptcy and the automatic stay still in effect. 
A month later, on October 28, 2010 at 11: 17 a.m., KIlO's bankruptcy was dismissed and 
the automatic stay was lifted. (Augmented Record, A1ay 3, 2013 A/I (~f iVlichael T Howard, 
Er:. 12) On the same day at 3:45 p.m, Golub re-recorded his judgment against KHD and the 
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other defendants in Kootenai County. (Augmented Record, A1ay 3, 2013 All of iVfichael T 
1 IOH'ard, ~l 1 0) 
On May 4, 2011 KHD flIed Chapter 7 bankruptcy in Nevada (11-16944-mkn), which 
again stayed any collection elTorts by Golub. (Augmented Record, May 3, 2013 Afr of Michael 
T Howard, Ex. 13) Despite its purported $1.3 5M Deed of Trust, KHD again did not list any 
secured claims to the property and did not list Kirk-Scott as a secured creditor on its Chapter 7 
bankruptcy schedules. (Augmented Record, May 3, 2013 Aff. of Michael T Howard, Ex. 13) 
Instead, Balinda Antoine is listed as a secured creditor on the schedules, but no creditors' claim 
was flIed and the nature of the security interest is not identified. (Augmented Record, A1ay 3, 
2013 All of Michael T Howard, Ex. 13, p. 10) KHD's second bankruptcy case was closed on 
May 29, 2012 without discharge. (A ugmented Record, May 3, 2013 Ail of A1ichael T Howard, 
Ex. 14) 
C. Course of proceedings. 
Based on the judgment lien on the real property held by KHD, Mr. Golub initiated a 
declaratory judgment action in January of 2013 to have the court declare his priority position 
over Kirk-Scott's 2004 Deed of Trust, so that he could proceed to collect against the real 
property. (R. Vol. I, pp. 28-32) On May 9, 2013, Golub moved for summary judgment on the 
issue of the priority. CR. Vol. I, pp. 67-97) On June 24, 2013, Kirk-Scott moved to vacate the 
March 11,2009 Default Judgment pursuant to I.R.c.P. 60(b). (R. Vol. I, pp. 111-113) 
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On August 9, 2013, the trial court denied Kirk-Scott's motion to vacate and granted 
Golub's motion for summary judgment, finding his judgment lien to have priority over all other 
of the defendants' interest in the property. (R. Vol. I, pp. 4f.1-421) 
Kirk-Scott then moved to "alter or amend" the judgment pursuant to LR.C.P. 59(a). 
(R. Vol. I, pp. 440-442) Golub's counsel contacted Kirk-Scott's counsel by letter, notifying him 
that the most recent motion was one for reconsideration of the motion to vacate which was 
specifically disallowed under I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B); Kirk-Scott disagreed and proceeded. (See 
R. Vol. I. pp. 491-492) The Kirk-Hughes Defendants joined the motion. (R. Vol. I. 549) The 
court denied the motion and awarded sanctions on its own motion because there existed no 
authority for the motion, nor any good faith argument for extension of law to support the motion. 
(R. Vol. I. pp. 548-557) 
Kirk-Scott now appeals the trial court's rulings, asserting that the court abused its 
discretion in not vacating the default judgment, erred in granting summary judgment and abused 
its discretion in awarding sanctions.2 
ARGUMENT 
The Kirk-Hughes Defendants and Kirk-Scott have engaged in a variety of strategies in an 
attempt to block Golub's collection efforts on the only available asset the defendants own - the 
2 The Kirk-Hughes Defendants also appeal the summary judgment and sanctions in the consolidated action, which 
will be responded to separately. 
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real property held by KIlD in Idaho. While these machinations are complex and meant to 
confuse, the relevant undisputed facts as properly ferreted out by the trial court are not. Golub is 
the judgment creditor on a $941,000 judgment against KHD granted in 2009 and recorded in 
2010 on the real property KHD owns. Kirk-Scott filed a six-year-old Deed of Trust on the 
property in 2010, while KHD was in bankruptcy. No basis exists to vacate the default judgment, 
and Kirk-Scott's claim that Golub's judgment lacks priority over its Deed of Trust is not 
supported by the law or the facts, and the court properly exercised its discretion to award 
sanctions. 
A. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to vacate a default judgment 
entered over four years before the motion was made. 
A trial court is vested with broad discretion in determining whether to grant a Rule 60(b) 
motion to vacate a judgment; it will be reviewed only upon a clear abuse of discretion. In re 
Jane Doe 1,145 Idaho 650,182 P.3d 707 (2008). Thus, absent a showing of arbitrary disregard 
for the relevant facts and principles of law by the court below, the Supreme Court will aftirm the 
lower court's decision to grant or deny relief Sherwood & Roberts, Inc. v. Riplinger, 103 Idaho 
535, 650 P.2d 677 (1982). Contrary to Kirk-Scott's argument, that discretion is not limited here 
by the concepts discussed in Duetz-Allis Credit Corp. v. Smith, 117 Idaho 118, 785 P.2d 682 (Ct. 
App. 1990). There, the court referenced the limitation on a trial court's discretion in a motion to 
vacate only when procedural safeguards have been ignored, such as notice to a party that has 
appeared before entry of the default. Id. at 120. No such notice defects are alleged here, and the 
trial court retained full discretion to determine the impropriety of setting aside a default judgment 
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six years after entry. In fact, the court's discretion to grant relief on a motion to vacate is 
bounded by the requirement that the party seeking relief demonstrate "unique and compelling 
circumstances which justify such relief." Printcraft Press, Inc. v. Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc., 
153 Idaho 440, 449-50, 283 P.3d 757 (2012). 
Here, there are no such exceptional circumstances, but instead only the attempts of 
interrelated individuals and companies to block collection of a properly obtained judgment. 
Kirk-Scott asserts that the district court erred in ruling that it had not met its burden of 
establishing that its Rule 60(b) motion was brought within a reasonable time; while somewhat 
confusing, Kirk-Scott apparently asserts that (1) the trial court applied an improper standard in 
analyzing evidence of when Kirk-Scott was aware of the judgment; (2) Kirk-Scott had no 
adverse standing to attack it as a non-party; and (3) that once served with the Complaint in the 
Declaratory Action, it acted diligently. (See Kirk-Scott Appellant's Brief at pp. 22-23) None of 
these claims relieved Kirk-Scott of proving the timeliness of its motion, which it did not do. The 
trial court properly analyzed the facts, and exercised its discretion to deny the motion to vacate. 
1. Rule 60(b) requires the moving party to prove the motion was brought within 
"a reasonable time"; Kirk-Scott failed to meet its burden to establish such 
reasonableness, including proof of when it became aware of the judgment. 
Kirk-Scott sought relief from the Default Judgment under I.R.C .P. 60(b) which provides: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his 
legal representative from a final judgment ... for the following reasons: 
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered 
evidence ... (3) fraud ... misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
(4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or 
discharged ... or it is no longer cquitable that the judgment should have 
prospective application; (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation 
- 8 -
of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for 
reasons (1), (2), and (3), not more than six (6) months after the judgment ... was 
entered ... (emphasis added) 
The party moving to have a judgment set aside bears the burden of proving his right to 
relief. First Sec. Bank of Idaho, NA. v. Stauffer, 112 Idaho 133, 139,730 P.2d 1053 (CL App. 
1986). Whether a Rule 60(b) motion is timely is an issue of fact for the district court. Davis v. 
Parrish, 131 Idaho 595, 597, 961 P.2d 1198 (1998). A district court is only vested with the 
discretion to set aside a default judgment if the moving party has complied with the time for 
making such motion. Catledge v. Transport Tire Co., Inc., 107 Idaho 602, 691 P .2d 1217 
(1984). 
It must appear that the movant has acted "promptly and diligently in seeking relief." 
Stoner v. Turner, 73 Idaho 117, 121,247 P.2d 469 (1952) The trial court applies the proper 
standard in determining whether a movant acts within a reasonable time to set aside a default 
judgment when it bases its determination upon whether the movants acted "promptly" once they 
learned of the default judgment. Wright v. Wright, 130 Idaho 918, 922, 950 P.2d 1257 (1998). 
When a movant challenges a judgment under LR.C.P. 60(b), the court examines the length of 
time between "the moment the judgment became apparent" to the movant, and the date the 
Rule 60(b) motion is filed. Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283, 291, 221 P.3d 81 (2009). 
Whether a motion for relief from judgment is timely is a factual issue for the district court. 
Meyers, 148 Idaho 291. 
After acknowledging these legal requirements, the district court denied Kirk-Scott's Rule 
60(b) motion to vacate the default judgment because Kirk-Scott "has provided no evidence to the 
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Court as to when it became aware of the judgment in question," thus Kirk-Scott "has failed to 
meet its burden of showing that its Rule 60(b) motion is timely." (R. Vol. /, p. 416) 
Kirk-Scott argues that it was inappropriate for the court to analyze when Kirk-Scott was 
"aware" of the judgment for the purposes of determining if it met its burden to establish that it 
acted within the required reasonable time. It is undisputed that Kirk-Scott made its motion under 
Rule 60(b), and that the court was entitled to engage in a fact specific inquiry on the 
reasonableness of the time within which the motion was brought. The timeliness requirement 
has been applied even when a non-party moves for relief under Rule 60(b). In Johnson v. 
Pioneer Tille Co. of Ada County, 104 Idaho 727, 662 P.2d 1171 (Cl. App. 1983) the eourt 
analyzed whether a non-party met the time requirement in Rule 60(b) by tiling its first motion to 
vacate within 21 days after entry of the judgment, even though it thereafter had to move to 
intervene and remake the motion; the court analyzed the pre-intervention and post-intervention 
conduct of the movant to determine if it met the timeliness requirement. A party seeking relief 
from a judgment must exercise due diligence in prosecution of its rights. Kovachy v. 
DeLeusomme, 122 Idaho 973, 975, 842 P.2d 309 eCt. App. 1992). 
As a result, the trial court here could certainly analyze the fact of when Kirk-Scott was 
aware of the judgment in determining the reasonableness in the timing of Kirk-Scott's motion. 
(In fact as a majority member ofKHD, the court could impute KHD's knowledge to Kirk-Scott.) 
Kirk-Scott's failure to present evidence to establish the motion was timely brought in turn 
establishes the court's correct exercise of its discretion. No basis exists to overturn the ruling. 
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2. A non-party to the judgment sought to be vacated is also required to 
establish timeliness. 
Kirk-Scott asserts that it lacked standing to attack the default judgment under Rule 60(b) 
until the Declaratory Judgment action was filed, and thus its motion was automatically made 
within a reasonable time. There are several errors in this argument. 
First, as noted in Golub's original brief in opposition to the motion to vacate, Kirk-Scott 
not only failed to establish that she brought the motion within a reasonable time from its entry, or 
a reasonable time from the first awareness of it, but also failed to offer any explanation why 
months went by after the Declaratory Judgment action was filed before it brought the motion to 
vacate. (Kirk-Scott apparently admits that it had some obligation to act at that time.) Kirk-Scott 
failed to meet its burden and no other facts are relevant. When a movant fails to ofTer an 
explanation for a delay of even a few months in asking for relief, a trial court finding that a 
movant did not act within a reasonable time is not erroneous. Viajax Corp. v. Stuckenbrock, 134 
Idaho 65, 995 P.2d 835 (Ct. App. 2000). 
Next, Idaho law recognizes (but limits) the right of a non-party to collaterally attack a 
judgment if it is void, and the non-party is adversely afTected. See Burns v. Baldwin, 138 Idaho 
480, 486, 65 P.3d 502 (2003). However, the rule governing relief from a judgment on the basis 
that the judgment is void does not provide a license for litigants to "sleep" on their rights. United 
Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. E~pinosa, 559 U.S. 260 (2010). An objection that a judgment is void 
under I.R.c.P. 60(b)(4) must be brought within a reasonable time. Blanc v. Laritz, 119 Idaho 
359,361,806 P.2d 452 (Ct. App. 1991); McGrew v. McGre}v, 139 Idaho 551, 559, 82 P.3d 833 
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(2003). That "reasonable time" is also measured by the time from actual notice of the judgment 
to when the objection is made. Blanc, 119 Idaho at 361. Thus, a non-party's "standing" to attack 
the judgment does not divest the court of its discretion to analyze the timeliness of its conduct in 
attacking the judgment. Idaho courts can properly analyze the timeliness of a motion by a non-
party utilizing all the facts, i.e. when the default was entered, and how quickly the non-party 
moved to vacate, both before and after they were actually made a party. See Johnson, supra. 
The trial court did not err in requiring Kirk-Scott to affirmatively establish some basis that the 
motion was reasonably timely brought. 
Kirk-Scott's assertion that the judgment did not adversely atfect it until the declaratory 
judgment action was tiled, such that it could move to vacate until then is also incorrect. Contrary 
to this argument, the trial court did not require Kirk-Scott to "guess" at the effect of Golub's 
judgment; a recorded judgment creates a lien on the real property of a debtor as a matter of law. 
I.C. § 10-111 O. Kirk-Scott claims it had an interest in the property. It is presumed to know the 
law, and there was no need for it to "guess" at whether Golub's recorded judgment potentially 
impacted the property. A deed of trust ho lder on property on which there was a judgment lien is 
indeed "affected" by the point of the entry of judgment and has a sufficient interest at that time if 
it intends to attack the judgment. 
3. While it is not Golub's burden to establish timelines, the only facts before the 
court demonstrate that Kirk-Scott did not act timely. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Kirk-Scott had not met its burden 
of establishing timeliness of the motion. Even on appeal, Kirk-Scott continues to point to one 
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primary fact - - it filed a motion four months after being sued for declaratory relief (although it 
points to the three month period after her answer).3 It fails to explain the four month delay, and 
no other analysis need to be done to establish that the court below did not abuse its discretion in 
denying the motion based on timeliness. See Via/ax, supra. 
Moreover, Kirk-Scott also fails to explain how lack of notice of the judgment is possible, 
in light of the fact that Kirk-Scott is a 51.5% member in KHD, the judgment debtors; Antoine 
herself is a member with 3% interest. (Augmented Record, May 3, 2013 A/I of Michael T 
Howard, },x. 10, p. 23) KHD's bankruptcy petitions in 2009 and 2011 also listed Golub as a 
creditor, and a judgment creditor; Kirk-Scott and Antoine were in privity with KHD and would 
have known of the bankruptcy petitions and their contents. (Augmented Record, May 3, 2013 
Air of Michael T Howard, Ex:. 10, pp. 4, 17: Ex. 12, pp. 13,19) In fact, Antoine was listed as a 
secured creditor on the schedules in the 2011 bankruptcy and would have been served with the 
pleadings. (ld., Ex. 12, p. 10) The trial court's discretion includes the ability to apply its findings 
of fact in a logical manner. Dawson v. Cheyovich Family Trust, 149 Idaho 375, 234 P.3d 699 
(2010). Interestingly, Antoine claims that Golub was fully aware of her and Kirk-Scott's 
connections to the project via their history of involvement; surely the same was true of 
Antione/Kirk-Scott's knowledge of Golub's role, and pursuit of his damage claim. The trial court 
3 Kirk-Scott also cites to the conclusory statement in Antoine's Affidavit that she had no knowledge of the default 
judgment prior to being served with the declaratory action; that affidavit was not provided to the court in support of 
the motIOn to vacate the judgment. It was provided to the court on the motion to amend. and reconsideration of a 
Rule 60(b) motion is prohibited. 
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simply did not err in exercising its discretion to determine that factually, the motion to vacate 
was untimely under thc rule. 
B. Even if the court were to address additional merits of the motion to vacate the 
default judgment, which was rendered unnecessary by the failure of Kirk-Scott to 
establish timeliness, no basis exists to void the judgment. 
1. The Complaint and course of proceedings adequately established the amount 
of the judgment. 
In addition to its claim that its motion to vacate was timely, Kirk-Scott also argues that 
the default judgment \vas void based on its underlying argument that the amount of the judgment 
exceeded the amount pleaded in Complaint. While the district court did not abuse its discretion 
in finding the motion to have been untimely, Kirk-Scott also presented no evidence that the 
judgment could be voided. 
The grounds on which a judgment can be voided are limited and narrowly construed. 
Hartman v. United Heritage Property & Casualty Co., 141 Idaho 193, 108 P.3d 340 (2005). 
There must be some jurisdictional defect in the court's authority to enter the judgment, either 
because the court lacks personal jurisdiction or because it lack jurisdiction over the subject 
matter of the suit. Cuevas v. Barraza, 152 Idaho 890, 894,277 P.3d 337 (2012). 
Kirk-Scott apparently attempts to "void" the judgment by claiming that the amount of the 
judgment exceeded the trial court's jurisdiction. However, the judgment rendered did not differ 
from the relief sought in the Complaint, and thus the trial court did not err in refusing to declare 
it void. The Judgment entered by the court on March 11, 2009 provided: 
This matter, having come before the Court upon Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Default Judgment and I.R.c.P. S4(b) Certificate against Debtor, and 
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supported by the Affidavits of Michael T. Howard and Alan Golub, and the 
pleadings on file, the Court does hereby enter Judgment against Debtors as 
follows: 
1. Plaintiffs are granted judgment in the principal amount of 
$941,000.00; 
2. Plaintiffs are granted pre-judgment interest at a rate of 12% 
beginning March 11, 2005 through entry of this judgment; 
3. Plaintiffs are granted post-judgment interest to be determined by law 
from entry of this judgment. 
(Augmented Record, May 3,2013 Aff of Michael T Howard, Ex.8) 
LR.C.P. 54(c) states that a judgment by default is limited to the relief demanded in the 
Complaint. See LR.C.P.54(c). The Idaho Supreme Court has interpreted this provision in 
conjunction with I.R.C.P. 8(t) to mean that where no answer is filed, the relief granted cannot 
exceed that actually demanded somewhere in the complaint when considered in its entirety. See, 
Johnson v. Hartford Ins. Group, 99 Idaho 134, 138, 578 P.2d 676 (1978). The theory of this 
provision is that the defending party should be able to decide on the basis of the relief requested 
whether he wants to expend the time, effort, and money necessary to defend the action. See id. 
Here, Golub's Complaint, when read in as a whole, fairly apprised KHD of the type and 
amount of damages elaimed. The Complaint alleges: 
• Geraldine Kirk-Hughes was the managing member of Kirk-Hughes Development and 
Polatis was an agent of Kirk-Hughes and Kirk-Hughes Development. (R. Vol. l, 
pp. 163-164, ~!'i3.2. 3.3) 
• Golub and Pacific Realty had a "Listing Agreement" with Petersons for the sale of the 
Peterson Property; which entitled Golub and Pacific Realty to payment of a 








Golub secured a written sales agreement with Geraldine Kirk-Hughes to buy the 
Peterson Property. (R. Vol. I, p. 164, ,[3. 7) 
Kirk-Hughes did not close on the Peterson Property, which was later sold to Polatis 
and transferred to Kirk-Hughes Development. (R. Vol. 1, p. 165, '1~3.1l, 3.16, 3.17, 
3.19) 
As a result of Peterson's sale of the Peterson Property to Polatis and subsequent 
transfer to Kirk-Hughes Development, Peterson did not pay Golub the $941,000 
commission under the Listing Agreement and Golub lost his interest in the Adkinson 
Property. (R. Vol. 1, p. 166,,3.23) 
Pacific Realty assigned Golub its interests in the action. (R. Vol. I, p, 164, ~3. 6) 
Defendants were aware of the Listing Agreement between Petersons and Golub. 
(R. Vol.l,p. 167, ~6.2) 
Defendants intentionally interfered with the contractual relationships and expectations 
of Golub when they acted to frustrate and circumvent the purpose of the Listing 
Agreement. (R. Vol.l,p. 167, ~6.3) 
• As a direct and proximate result of said breaches, Golub has been damaged in an 
amount to be proven at trial. (R. Vol. 1, p. 167 ~6. 4) 
• Wherefore, Plaintiff prays: 
o Judgment be granted in favor of Plaintiffs for all claims against Defendants in 
an amount to be proven at trial, but more than the jurisdictional limit in excess 
of $1 0,000.00; 
o Plaintiffs recover pre-judgment interest; and 
o For such other relief the Court deems just and equitable. 
(R. Vol. 1, p. 169) 
When read as a whole, Golub's Complaint fairly apprised KHD that it was seeking from 
all Defendants as damages the $941,000 in commissions owed but never paid under the Listing 
Agreement with Peterson. It also fairly apprised KI ID that Golub was seeking interest, which is 
- 16 -
provided by statute at the rate of 12% for pre-judgment interest, and at an indexed rate for post-
judgment interest. See I.C. §12-22-104; Dillon v. A1ontgornery, 138 Idaho 614, 617, 67 P.3d 93 
(2003) (I.C. § 28-22-104(2) provides for the award of prejudgment interest at a rate of 12 percent 
on "[m]oney after the same becomes due." Prejudgment interest may be awarded under this 
statute where the amount of liability is liquidated or capable of ascertainment by a mathematical 
calculation. ) 
Moreover, unlike a typical judgment by default, KHD appeared, answered, and defended 
Golub's claims for over a year and a half before an Order of Default was entered. When an 
Answer is tiled the court may grant any relief consistent with the case made by Complaint. See 
Schlie/Iv. Bistline, 52 Idaho 353, 15 P.2d 726 (1932). During that time, KHD was apprised 
more fully of Golub's claims and damages through discovery, to include the following: 
INTERROGATORY NO.1: Please describe in detail all damages you have 
allegedly suffered as a result of Defendants' conduct. 
ANSWER: Plaintiffs have suffered a loss of the principal amount of the 
commission due under the Listing Agreement with Peterson, based upon 
Peterson's Purchase and Sale Agreement with Kirk-Hughes. Plaintiffs have 
also suffered a loss of the interest due on that commission beginning 
November 12, 2004. Plaintiffs have also suffered a loss of the value of the 
Adkinson Property on the date it was transferred Kirk-Hughes. Plaintiffs 
have and continue to incur costs and attorney fees in pursuit of recovering 
the above-referenced damages. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.1: Produce copies of all documents 
that illustrate or explain your alleged damages. 
RESPONSE: All documents relevant to this request have been previously 
produced, which include: 1) Net Listing Agreement; and 2) Peterson/Kirk-
Hughes Purchase and Sale Agreement. This request will be supplemented as 
additional, relevant documents are discovered or identified. 
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(R. Vol. L p. 355) 
The Purchase and Sale Agreement produced in discovery provided the sales price of the 
property. The Net Listing Agreement provided the method of calculating the realtor fees owed. 
Accordingly, the March 11, 2009 Judgment entered by the Court did not ditler from the 
relief sought in the Complaint or asserted and learned during the subsequent year and a half of 
litigation between the parties. The court did not lack "jurisdiction" to enter the default judgment. 
2. No basis existed under Rule 60(b)(5) or (6) to vacate. 
As outlined above, as a non-party to the judgment, Kirk-Scott could only challenge the 
Default Judgment on the basis it was void under Rule 60(b)( 4). Thus, its challenge to the denial 
of its motion based on the failure of the court to analyze any basis under LR.C.P. 60(b)(5) and 
(6) is irrelevant. (The court's appropriate tlnding on timeliness also moots this claim on appeal.) 
Irrespecti ve of that, no basis exists under either of these grounds to vacate the judgment. 
First, Kirk-Scott's claim that the judgment was "prospective" under Rule 60(b)(5) and 
thus subject to vacation misapplies the detlnition of "prospective. II A prospective judgment is 
one in which the judgment is "executory" or involves the supervision of changing conduct or 
conditions, such as a continuing decree of injunction. Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283, 290, 
221 P.3d 81 (2009). A compensatory damage award is not a prospective judgment. ld. Golub's 
judgment was simply a compensatory damage award. Golub had the right to the award, and 
there was no necessity for the court to monitor future performance. 
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Similarly, no basis exists under Rule 60(b)(6) based on any "catchall" basis, which 
requires "unique and compelling" circumstances to justify the relief. In re Estate of Bagley, 117 
Idaho 1091, 1093,793 P.2d 1263 (Ct. App. 1990). The only circumstance Kirk-Scott addresses 
is again the amount of the judgment based on the state of the pleadings before the court. As 
outlined above, the pleadings, including the affidavits in support of the judgment, put the 
defendants on more than adequate notice to enable them to determine the efficacy of resisting the 
Complaint, which they in fact did, until withdrawal from the suit. 
C. The trial court properly granted summary judgment on the undisputed facts which 
established that Golub's Judgment had priority over all other interests. 
The Supreme Court reviews a ruling on summary judgment under the same standard as 
the trial court. Gracie. LLC v. Idaho State Tax Com'n., 149 Idaho 570, 237 P.3d 1196 (2010). 
Summary judgment is proper if the undisputed facts establish no genuine issue of material fact 
for trial. I.R.C.P.56. If a case proceeds as a bench trial in front of the district court, the district 
court, as the trier of fact, is entitled to arrive at the most probable inference based upon the 
undisputed facts before it, and grant summary judgment despite the possibility of conflicting 
inferences. Gracie, 149 Idaho at 572. The appellate court thus engages in the same analysis, and 
the undisputed facts and reasonable inferences here establish Golub's right to summary 
judgment. 
1. Golub's judgment lien need not be supported by good faith or additional 
consideration to establish priority. 
Kirk-Scott asserts that the trial court should have found that Golub's judgment lien is 
inferior to Kirk-Scott's Deed of Trust under I.C. §55-606 because the trial court failed to find 
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that Golubs exercised "good faith" or provided additional consideration in addition to the 
judgment itself This is a misapplication of the requirement of the priority statute; those 
requirements apply to purchasers or encumbrancers, and not to those holding judgment liens. 
Idaho Code section 55-606 governs the treatment of a judgment lien in determining 
priority of interests in real property and provides: 
Every grant or conveyance of an estate in real property is conclusive against the 
grantor, also against everyone subsequently claiming under him, except a 
purchaser or encumbrancer, who in good faith, and for a valuable consideration, 
acquires a title or lien by an instrument Q! valid judgment lien that is first duly 
recorded. (Emphasis added) 
I.e. §55-606. 
Kirk-Scott's position rests upon an misinterpretation of I.e. §55-606 that conditions the 
priority of a judgment lien upon good faith and the giving of valuable consideration. Courts 
interpreting a statute are to give effect to legislative intent. See Robison v. Bateman~Hall, Inc., 
l39 Idaho 207, 210, 76 P.3d 951 (2003). The interpretation of a statute must begin with the 
literal words of the statute. State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 475,163 P.3d 1183 (2007). The 
plain meaning of a statute therefore will prevail unless clearly expressed legislative intent is 
contrary or unless plain meaning leads to absurd results. Id. If the language of the statute is 
capable of more than one reasonable construction it is ambiguous. An ambiguous statute must 
be construed to mean what the legislature intended it to mean. Id. To ascertain legislative intent, 
the Court examines not only the literal words of the statute, but the reasonableness of the 
proposed interpretations, the policy behind the statute, and its legislative history. Id. 
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By its plain tenns, I.C. §55-606 does not condition the priority of a judgment lien upon 
good faith or the giving of additional consideration. When read as a whole, the statute provides 
protection to one of two classes of interest holders: (1) a purchaser or encumbrancer, who in 
good faith, and for a valuable consideration, acquires a title or lien by an instrument; or (2) a 
valid judgment lien. In appropriate statutory interpretation, the word "or" indicates alternative 
things; the word "or" in a statute should be given its usual "disjunctive meaning." State v. 
Rivera, 131 Idaho 8, 10. 951 P.2d 528 (Ct. App. 1998). The clauses here must be read 
disjunctively, because the use of the word "lien" more than once would otherwise be redundant 
and superfluous if the statute were not intended to distinguish a valid judgment lien from a lien 
by any another instrument taken in good faith for consideration. 
A review of the legislative history behind the 1989 amendment to the statute supports this 
reading. Prior to 1989, the statute did not include reference to judgment liens. In 1989, the 
legislature amended the statute by including the single phrase "or valid judgment lien." 
(R. Vol. ], p. 346) The stated purpose of the amendment provides: 
This legislation would provide that a valid judgment lien that is first duly 
recorded has priority over subsequently recorded grants or conveyances of an 
estate in real property. 
(R. Vol. I, p. 347) 
The minutes of the Judiciary and Rules Committee further provide: 
Senator Crapo presented this legislation and stated that it clarifies the effect of a 
valid judgment lien regarding a grant or conveyance of an estate in real property. 
The Supreme Court has recently allowed a judgment to be eliminated if the 
property is sold before collection can be made. 
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(R. Vol. I, p. 350) 
Reading the statute to require a judgment lienholder to exercise good faith or produce 
additional consideration is somewhat of a square peg in a round hole, and leads to an absurd 
result. The necessity of good faith and consideration serves the purpose of protecting the 
purchaser; a purchaser must exercise good faith to determine whether any prior interests exist on 
the property so that he knows what he is purchasing. The failure the possessor of an interest in 
property to provide would-be purchasers with notice of that prior interest necessarily may not use 
the failure to disclose to their advantage. This principle is based upon the notion of a bargained 
for exchange to allow the purchaser of an interest in land to know what he or she is buying. 
A lien by judgment is wholly different. A judgment lien is not bartered for or exchanged 
for value; the holder obtains its interest as a matter of a statutory lien granted to judgment 
creditors. See I.e. § 10-111 O. It exists as a matter of law, and not in an exercise of reaching a 
deal with the record owner or others. The judgment creditor cannot protect itself by choosing 
not to have been injured by the property owner, which give it its lien rights. There is no 
additional consideration necessary to give rise to the rights, nor is there any notice or knowledge 
of other superseding interest that impacts its rights; it simply is. 
Kirk-Scott relies upon A10untain Home Lumber Co., Ltd. v. Swartout, 30 Idaho 559, 166 
P. 271 (1917) for the proposition that a judgment is not valuable consideration for the purposes 
of determining a bona fide purchaser. Notwithstanding the fact that A10untain Home was 
decided on creditor / debtor principles in 1917, a time well before the legislature enacted 
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I.C. §55-606 and amended it to specifically include judgment liens in 1989, Kirk-Scott misreads 
the facts and opinion in Mountain Home and its reliance is therefore misplaced. 
The court in Mountain flame was tasked with determining the priority of various interests 
in real property. There, one Mr. Garrett had executed a warranty deed in property to one Mr. 
Swartwout. Mountain Home Lumber was a creditor of Garrett's and obtained a money judgment 
against him, \vhich became a lien on real property in his name. Unbeknownst to Swartwout, 
Mountam Home foreclosed upon its judgment lien by sheriff s sale. At the sale, Mountain Home 
bid the amount of the judgment it was owed and received a SherifT's Deed to the property. In 
holding that Swartwout's warranty deed had priority over Mountain Home's Sheriffs Deed, the 
court noted that Mountain Home's creditor's bid was not a valuable consideration (for the 
Sherin's Deed), as it was simply cancellation of a pre-existing indebtedness. See Mountain 
Home, 30 Idaho at 561. Contrary to Kirk-Scott's reading, the J\;fountain Home court did not 
address the validity or priority of Mountain Home's judgment lien and provides no authority for 
Kirk-Scott's position. 
Accordingly, neither the text of I.e. §55-606 nor the courts interpreting it require that any 
finding: of good faith or additional consideration, beyond the underlying obligation giving rise to 
the judgment, is necessary for the holder of a valid judgment lien to avail himself to the 
protections of I.e. §55-606. Kirk-Scott's argument underscores the absurdity that such a read of 
the statute would result in, and the trial court properly awarded Golub priority as a judgment 
lienholder without such findings. 
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2. While not necessary, the undisputed facts established that Golub had no 
knowledge of Kirk-Scott's unrecorded Deed of Trust for "good faith" 
purposes. 
Kirk-Scott incorrectly asserts that the trial court failed to "consider" the good faith 
elements of I.e. §55-606, which provides a judgment lien that is duly recorded has priority, if 
acquired in "good faith." This matter was extensively briefed to the court, and in finding that 
Golub held a valid judgment lien against the property which had priority, it by necessity found 
that no issues of fact existed to establish Golub had actual knowledge of Kirk-Scott's prior 
interest. This court's de novo analysis should similarly find. 
Kirk-Scott asserts that regardless of any recording deficiencies, Golub's judgment lien is 
inferior to its Deed of Trust because Golub had knowledge of the encumbrance at the time he 
recorded his Judgment and therefore did not take in "good-faith" under I.e. §55-606. However, 
Kirk-Scott has failed to present any evidence to contradict Golub's testimony or create an issue 
of fact regarding whether Golub held such knowledge. 
On a motion for summary judgment, once the moving party establishes the absence of a 
genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to show that a genuine 
issue of material fact does exist; a non-moving party must come forward with evidence by way 
of affidavit or otherwise which contradicts the evidence submitted by the moving party, and 
which establishes the existence of a material issue of disputed fact. See Kiebert v. Goss, 144 
Idaho 225. 228, 159 P.3d 862 (2007). The appellate court analyzes the evidence in the same 
fashion under its standard of review on summary judgment, and Kirk-Scott has not come forth 
with evidence to preclude summary judgment. 
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Here, Golub provided the following testimony regarding his knowledge of Kirk-Scott's 
Deed of Trust: 
12. I was not aware of the transfer of the Sloan properties from Kirk-Scott to 
Kirk-Hughes Development on November 18, 2004. 
13. I was not aware of the transfer of the Atkinson property from Kirk-Hughes 
Associates to Kirk-Hughes Development on May 12,2005. 
14. I was not aware that Kirk-Scott had executed a Deed of Trust to Kirk-
Hughes Development prior to Kirk-Scott recording one during 
Kirk-Hughes Development's bankruptcy on September 17,2010. 
(R. Vol. 1. p. 96) 
Q. All right. Prior to 2013 when you were first handed a physical copy of the 
November 18, 2004 Kirk-Scott deed of trust, did you have any idea that 
Kirk-Scott claimed an interest in the properties? 
A. I did not know of any claim of interest in the properties or this deed of 
trust. No, I did not. 
(R. l/()l. 1. p. 99) 
Kirk-Scott cites the affidavits of Balinda Antoine, Geraldine Kirk-Hughes, and Darlene 
Moore for the purpose of attempting to create an issue of fact by contradicting Golub's testimony 
that he had no knowledge of Kirk-Scott's claimed Deed of Trust at the time he recorded his 
Judgment. However, a careful reading of the proffered testimony reveals that Golub's testimony 
remains uncontroverted. 
More specifically, the affidavits submitted to contradict Golub's testimony only provide 
evidence that Golub had knowledge of a desire or intent to encumber the property; they provide 
no evidence that he had knowledge that such an encumbrance actually attached to any of the 
subject properties. 
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As between a mortgagee and another claimant, one who has actual notice of the 
other's prior claim or lien generally takes subject to it, even though the prior claim 
or lien is unrecorded. 
In order to have this efIeet, the notice or knowledge must be acquired prior to the 
attaching of the rights of the party to be afIected by it. Actual notice of a 
mortgage is express, direct information. Notice does not mean a formal written 
warning served on a party. Instead, it means actual knowledge of the fact in 
question, regardless of how it was acquired. However, it must be knowledge of 
the actual existence of the prior conveyance or encumbrance and not merely 
information of a purpose or agreement on the part of the grantor to make or 
give it. 
59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 298 (emphasis added). 
Construing the priority of interests under I.e. §55-612, the Idaho Supreme Court has 
similarly held that knowledge of an intent to create or acquire an interest in property is not a 
legally recognizable interest that would constitute an adverse claim for purposes of defeating the 
status as a bona tide purchaser. In Sun Valley Hot Springs Ranch, Inc. v. Kelsey, 131 Idaho 657, 
661,962 P.2d 1041 (1998), the Court explained this concept as follows: 
In discussing whether a party had actual or constructive notice in regards to 
determining its bona tide purchaser status, this Court in Bear Island Waler Ass'n. 
Inc. v. Brown, 125 Idaho 717, 874 P.2d 528 (1994), concluded that a party's prior 
notice of another party's use of a well did not create a real property right in the 
party using the well. A purchaser's prior notice of another party's use of property 
does not create any real property right in the using party that would serve as an 
adverse claim that could defeat the purchaser's status as a bona fide purchaser. Id. 
at 725-26, 874 P.2d at 536-37. Where notice of another party's "use" of property 
does not create a property right in the using party, it follows that notice of another 
party's "intent" to use property in the future would not create a property right in 
that party. 
Sun Valley Hot Springs Ranch, Inc., 131 Idaho at 661. 
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In a recent decision addressing the same issue presented here, the Court in Insight, LLC v. 
Gunter, 154 Idaho 779, 302 P.3d 1052 (2013), rejected evidence similar to that protTered by 
Kirk-Scott holding: 
It is not technically possible for 1M to have notice of an encumbrance on property 
before that encumbrance actually comes into existence. Though 1M knew that 
Summitt was intending to execute a deed of trust, that was notice of an intent to 
subsequently encumber property, not notice of an actual encumbrance on 
property. Therefore, the district court's tinding that 1M had notice of the Gunters' 
deed of trust is clearly erroneous. 
Insi:..;ht, 154 Idaho at 783-84. 
Here, none of the evidence cited by Kirk-Scott contradicts Golub's testimony that he had 
no knowledge of Kirk-Scott's encumbrance prior to recording his Judgment in October 2010. 
The following provides the sum total of evidence Kirk-Scott relies on for this issue: 
Affidavit of Balinda Antoine 
lOuring a presentation in Coeur d' Alene in 2004] I wanted to make it clear to Mr. Golub 
that Kirk-Scott Ltd. wanted first position title to the property. For if the project went bad I 
wanted to at least be able to recover the property and didn't want my loan secured by a 
piece of property that had other liens associated with it. I wanted to make clear, and made 
clear, that Kirk-Scott wasn't going to loan $1,350,000 without getting a deed to the 
property. 
Kirk-Scott, Ltd. protected its $1,350,000 loan with a deed of trust. Again, Mr. Golub was 
aware that Kirk-Scott, Ltd. would be using such a deed to secure its interest in the 
property because I told him that in the presentation he gave at the Coeur d' Alene 
Resort. 
(R. Vol. I, p. 250) (emphasis added) 
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Ms. Antoine's Aflidavit does nothing more than demonstrate her intent to gain some 
future security for the properties being purchased. Her statements to Golub in this regard pre-
dated the purported Deed of Trust by many months. 
Affidavit of Geraldine Kirk-Hughes 
In September 2004 .. .I told Mr. Golub that I was forming a separate entity to develop the 
land, and that title to all the prope11ies would be transferred to the new company. I 
specifically told Mr. Golub that I was giving my sister a mortgage or deed of trust to 
secure Kirk -Scott, Ltd.' s interest. 
(R. Vol. 1. p. 313) (emphasis added) 
In November of 2004, your affIant requested Darlene Moore to prepare a Note and Deed 
of Trust in favor of Kirk-Scott, Ltd. to cover the monies spent by Balinda Antoine to 
acquire the Sloan parcel. Your afliant specifically informed Alan of this .... 
(R. Vol. 1. pp. 315-316) 
After Ms. Moore prepared the Note and Deed, your Affiant signed the same. '" 
(R. Vol. 1, p. 316) 
Ms. Kirk-Hughes' Affidavit demonstrates her September 2004 intent to give Balinda 
Antoine (as opposed to Kirk-Scott Ltd.) a future mortgage or deed of trust. It then states that 
Golub was informed of a request to prepare a Deed of Trust to Kirk-Scott in November 2004. 
Finally. it evidences that after the document was prepared, it was executed by Ms. Kirk-Hughes. 
Importantly, Ms. Kirk-Hughes' Aflidavit does not provide the evidence necessary to 
contradict Golub's testimony; that Golub had knowledge that a Deed of Trust encumbering the 
properties at issue here had been executed in favor of Kirk-Scott. Like that of Ms. Antoine, 
Ms. Kirk-Hughes' Affidavit goes no further than to provide evidence that Golub was informed of 
an intent to provide Kirk-Scott with a Deed of Trust interest in the property at some point in the 
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future; not that he had knowledge that one had in fact been created. See e.g, Insight. 154 Idaho 
at 783-84. (It is not technically possible to have notice of an encumbrance on property before 
that encumbrance actually comes into existence.) 
Affidavit of Darlene Moore 
In November of 2004 ... 1 advised Alan that it was my belief that Ms. Kirk-Hughes was 
still interested in the property and still interested in pursuing the development because 
she had just recently created a corporation called Kirk-Hughes Development and had 
asked me to prepare a Note and Deed of Trust in favor of her sister, Balinda 
Antoine, to exchange for the title to the Sloan property that had been purchased in Kirk-
Scott, Ltd. name. Alan had proposed that Ms. Kirk-Hughes use the Sloan parcel to 
acquire financing to assist Ms. Kirk-Hughes in purchasing the Peterson property. 1 told 
them this was not possible as I had already prepared the mortgage in favor of 
Balinda. 
(R. Vol. 1, pp. 306-3(7) (emphasis added) 
In 2006 '" 3) I reminded Alan that Balinda Antoine had a mortgage on the Sloan parcel 
so there would be no asset to collect against. 
(R. Vol. 1, pp. 307-3(8) 
Like that of Ms. Kirk-Hughes', Ms. Moore's Affidavit only purports to establish that she 
informed Golub that she prepared some instrument, but provides no testimony that Golub had 
knowledge that an instrument encumbering the property was actually executed. Moreover, 
Moore's Affidavit is unclear as to whether she informed Golub that she prepared a Deed of Trust 
or a mortgage.4 Clearly, if she informed Golub that she had prepared a mortgage, it cannot be 
said that he had knowledge of a Deed of Trust. 
4 Deeds of Trust differ from Mortgages in that deeds of trust always involve at least three parties, where the third 
party holds the legal title, while in the context of mortgages, the mortgagor gives legal title directly to the 
mortgagee. 
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What is clear from Ms. Moore's AnIdavit is that whatever encumbrance was intended, 
she informed Golub that it related solely to the Sloan property5 and was in favor of Balinda 
Antoine; not Kirk-Scott Ltd.6 - " 
Golub has provided undisputed evidence that he had no knowledge of Kirk-Scott's 
purported encumbrance on the properties at issue here. The Affidavits of Antoine, Kirk-Hughes, 
and Moore do not contradict that evidence or otherwise create an issue of fact because they do 
not show that Golub was in any manner aware of the Deed of Trust after it came into existence 
on November 18, 2004. 
Where, as here, defendants failed to produce any admissible evidence controverting 
Golub's testimony, the trial court properly made a summary ruling that Golub had priority and 
no prior knowledge of Kirk-Scott's Deed of Trust. 
3. Golub's judgment lien is valid. 
In challenging the grant of summary judgment on the lien property, Kirk-Scott returns 
again and again to the validity of the underlying judgment. That attack should fail "vith its 
motion to vacate the default judgment as outlined above. Moreover, the law does not preclude a 
judgment lien's priority based on lack of additional consideration or based on lack of an 
I.R.C.P. 54(b) certificate. (The lack of consideration has been fully addressed above and will not 
be repeated here.) 
5 Ex. A to the November 18, 2004 Deed of Trust identifies only two of the three Sloan parcels, and includes the 
Atkinson parcel. 
6 Ms. Moore's Affidavit provides no foundation to establish she has personal knowledge of a mortgage executed in 
favor of Balinda Antoine. 
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Kirk-Scott asserts that Golub's judgment lien is invalid because an I.R.c.P. 54(b) 
certificate was not recorded with the judgment. However, at the time Golub recorded the 
judgment on October 28, 2010 Golub did not require a 54(b) Certificate because the court had 
already entered judgment against all parties on all issues. 
An order or jUdgment is final if it disposes of all remaining claims, leaving none pending. 
See LR.C.P. 54(a); Idah-Be:·;t, Inc. v. First Security Bank of Idaho NA. Hailey Branch, 99 Idaho 
517,519,584 P.2d 1242 (1978); M&H Rentals, Inc. v. Sales, 108 Idaho 567,700 P.2d 970 (Ct. 
App. 1985). A certificate of final judgment is only required where the court seeks to direct entry 
of final judgment upon one or more, but less than all of the claim or parties. See l.R.C .P. 54(b). 
Rule 54(b) is designed to prevent piecemeal appellate litigation. By its own terms, it is 
inapplicable to a judgment that leaves no claims undecided. See AI&H, 108 Idaho at 569. 
Here. the Court entered a Judgment against all Defendants except Peterson on March 11, 
2009. (See Augmented Record, May 3, 2013 Af! olA1ichaei T. Howard, Ex 8) At that time, all 
claims against KHD were resolved but were not final for purposes of appeal because the claims 
against Peterson remained unresolved. See I.R.c.P. 54(b); l.A.R. 11. KHD filed a Notice of 
Bankruptcy on April 6, 2009, which prevented any further proceedings against it. (See 
/lugmented Record, lvfay 3, 2013 Ail ol Alichael T. Howard, Ix. 9) On August 10, 2009 the 
Court entered an Order, dismissing the remaining claims against Peterson. (See Augmented 
Record, May 3, 2013 All ollvfichael T. Howard. Ex. 11) However, because the Judgment 
against KHD remained in bankruptcy stasis, it lacked finality for appeal purposes and the Court 
entered a Rule 54(b) Certificate with regard to the remaining Defendants. (See Augmented 
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Record. lvlay 3. 2013 Afl of Michael T Hmvard, fj'x. 11) When the Order of Dismissal was 
entered in KHD's bankruptcy on October 28.2010, the automatic stay was lifted and the Default 
Judgment against KHD became final automatically without the need for a 54(b) Certificate. 
Golub recorded the Judgment abstract later that day. (See Augmented Record, May 3, 2013 Ail 
of Michael T. Howard, Ex. 8) Accordingly, Golub's October 28,2010 Judgment lien is valid. 
D. The court properly found that Kirk-Scott's recording was invalid based on lack of 
acknowledgement and because it was filed in violation of the bankruptcy stay as a 
matter of law. 
In addition to the undisputed fact that Golub had no actual knowledge of the Kirk-Scott 
Deed of Trust, the trial court properly found that when it was finally recorded, it lacked legal 
effect because it did not have the signer acknowledgement, and was filed in violation of the 
bankruptcy stay. As a result, the tiling was void and could not establish any constructive notice 
to defeat Golub's priority. Issues of law are reviewed de novo. State v. Olson, 138 Idaho 438, 
440,64 P.3d 967 eel. App. 2003). 
1. Kirk-Scott's September 17, 2010 recording is invalid because the Deed of 
Trust was not properly acknowledged or certified under Idaho or Nevada 
law. 
Idaho Code section 55-811 governs the effect of recording a transfer in real property: 
Every conveyance of real property acknowledged or proved, and certified, and 
recorded as prescribed by law, from the time it is filed with the recorder for 
record, is constructive notice of the contents thereof to subsequent purchasers and 
mortgage e )es .... 
I.C. §55-811 (emphasis added). Idaho Code section 55-805 reqUIres an instrument to be 
acknowledged in order to record it: 
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Before an instrument may be recorded, unless it is otherwise expressly provided, 
its execution must be acknowledged by the person executing it ... or if executed 
by a limited liability company, by the manager, member or other person executing 
the same on behalf of the limited liability company ... ; provided, that if such 
instrument shall have been executed and acknowledged in any other state or 
territory of the United States, or in any foreign country, according to the laws of 
the state ... the same shall be entitled to record, and a certificate of 
acknowledgement indorsed upon or attached to any such instrument ... shall 
be prima facie sufficient to entitle the same to such record. 
I.e. §55-805. (emphasis added) 
Like Idaho, Nevada law requires a certificate of acknowledgment; something more than 
the bare notary signature at issue here: 
Every conveyance in writing whereby any real property is conveyed or may be 
affected must be acknowledged or proved and certified in the manner 
provided in this chapter and NRS 240.161 to 240.169, inclusive. 
NRS 111.240. (emphasis added) 
3 A certificate of a notarial act is sufficient if it meets the requirements of 
subsections 1 and 2 and it: 
(a) Is in the short from set forth in NRS 240.166 to 240.169 
inclusive; 
NRS 240.1655(3 ). (emphasis added) 
NRS 240.1665 
capacity. 
Short form for acknowledgment in representative 
Upon compliance with the requirements of NRS 240.1655, the following 
certificate is sufficient for an acknowledgment in a representative capacity: 
State of Nevada 
County of ____ _ 
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NRS 240.1665 
This instrument was acknowledged before me on (date) by 
____ (name(s) of person(s» as ____ (type of authority, e.g. 
officer, trustee, etc.) of (name of party on behalf of 
whom instrument was executed) 
(Signature of notarial officer) 
(Seal, if any) 
Here, it is undisputed that the Deed of Trust lacks the certificate of acknowledgment 
required under Idaho and Nevada law and, therefore, was not entitled to recordation under I.e. 
§55-805. This result is not affected by the fact that the Kootenai County Recorder allowed its 
recordation. See Credit Bureau of Preston v. Sleight, 92 Idaho 210,215,440 P.2d 143 (1968) 
("An instrument recorded without an acknowledgment or with a defective acknowledgment is 
not entitled to be recorded and 'cannot impart constructive notice."') Neither is the result afIected 
because Golub "was not confused." (See Appellant~\' Brief, p. 34) Kirk-Scott mistakenly cites 
i\,1011endorf v. Derry, 95 Idaho 1, 501 P.2d 199 (1972), which lacks the cited quote, and has 
nothing to do with acknowledgment or recordation deficiency. Similarly, Afatheson v. Harris, 
98 Idaho 758, 572 P.2d 861 (1977) addressed whether a Earnest Money Agreement defectively 
acknowledged by the vendors rendered the document "false" for the purpose of establishing the 
elements of slander of title, and is irrelevant. Whether Golub could understand the Deed once 
showed to him is also wholly irrelevant as to the effect of failing to properly acknowledge the 
Deed before filing. Idaho law is clear that the Deed lacked validity. 
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2. Golub had standing to object to recordation of Kirk-Scott's deed of trust 
during bankruptcy stay. 
Apparently now conceding that a Deed of Trust filed in violation of a bankruptcy is void 
under In re Schwartz, 954 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1992), Kirk-Scott limits its appeal by asserting that 
the trial court erred in Ending that Golub had standing to enforce violation of the bankruptcy 
stay. Kirk-Scotl's position on standing is irrelevant in this case because Golub does not seek 
redress from the bankruptcy court for Kirk-Scott's bankruptcy stay violation. Neither Golub nor 
KHD needs to challenge Kirk-Scott's post-petition recordation because it is void a matter of 
federal law. 
Kirk-Scott's position on standing is only relevant if its violation of the bankruptcy stay is 
voidable. In such a circumstance, Golub would need to establish his standing in the bankruptcy 
proceeding to challenge the violation. Indeed, the authority relied upon by Kirk-Scott involves 
issues of standing in federal bankruptcy court, not state court. See, e.g. In re Brooks, 79 B.R. 
479 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1987); In re Stivers, 31 B.R. 735 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1983); In re Fuel Oil 
Supply and Terminaling, Inc., 30 B.R. 360 (N.D. Tex. 1983). 
However. federal law is clear that the recordation of a Deed of Trust or other instrument 
attempting to perfect an interest in real property during the stay is void See In Re Schwartz, 
supra; In re Ellis, 441 B.R. 656,662 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2010) ("If a creditor attempts to create an 
unauthorized post-petition lien on property of the estate, that transfer is void as a violation of the 
automatic stay."); In re Hegel, 2000 WL 33712298 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2000) (the offending party 
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need not have knowledge of the stay. since it is the violation of the stay, and not the mens rca, 
which controls); In re Franck, 171 B.R. 893, 895 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1994). 
Being void, the act of recordation is ineffective as a matter of federal law and the issue of 
Golub's standing is moot, and the trial court did not err. 
E. Idaho law does not provide for a reduction in judgment based on the settlement 
paid by a co-defendant. 
Kirk-Scott has cited no relevant authority for its argument that the amount received from 
a settling defendant in a tort case must be otrset against a judgment obtained from non-settling 
co-defendants. The cases Kirk-Scott has cited involve situations where damages were awarded 
or recovered at trial for specifically defined identical damage, particularly in contract cases. 
For example, in Gunter v. Murphy's Lounge, LLC, 141 Idaho 16, 105 P.3d 676 (2005), a 
Jury \vas specifically instructed to award damages for breach of contract and a tortious 
interference claim, but then defined the damages recoverable under each claim as the same, i.e. 
the lost income for the remainder of a breached base term. Under that circumstance, the trial 
court granted a new trial on the concept the instruction incorrectly allowed a "double damage." 
In EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002), the court addressed a situation in which an 
employee could pursue arbitration for employment claims while the EEOC simultaneously 
pursued an action for the same back payor damages sought by the employee. The court simply 
found that if the employee recovered specific relief, the right to recover the same damages by the 
EEOC would be limited. Neither these cases nor the other random courts cited by Kirk-Scott 
address the situation at bar. 
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Here, a plaintiff settled with a tortfeasor and thereafter obtained a judgment against a 
co-defendant on tort claims. Unlike the other instances, there was no judicial finding that the 
settling defendant paid an amount based on identically defined damages: the non-settling 
defendants did not go to trial and did not utilize the apportionment of fault available under Idaho 
law to determine what percentage of fault each tort feasor had. See I.C. §6-802. Nor is this a 
contract case in which the damage for breach is a specified amount which may not be recovered 
twice. 
Idaho law in fact recognizes the multiple recoveries that a plaintiff can obtain via a 
settlement. A release by an injured person of one tortfeasor who is not jointly and severally 
liable to the injured person, whether before or after judgment, does not discharge the other 
tortfeasor "or reduce the claim against another tortfeasor." I.C. §6-80S. The parties here are not 
joint and severally liable, and no basis exists to reduce the judgment by the settling amount. 
F. The court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning the Appellants for an 
improperly brought motion. 
Kirk-Scott specifically brought its "Motion to Amend the Judgment" under 
I.R.c.P. 59(a)(l), (6), and (7). By its terms, I.R.C.P. 59(a) allows for grant of a new trial where 
one has occurred. Where, as here, no trial took place, Kirk-Scotl's Motion under l.R.c.P. 59(a) 
could not be sustained and the trial court properly rejected any assertions or argument relying 
upon I.R.C.P. 59(a). Kirk-Scott was notified by Golub's counsel of the apparent error and given 
an opportunity to withdraw its motion, but chose not to do so. (R. Vol. !, pp. 491-492) The trial 
court awarded sanctions because Kirk-Scotl's "motion to amend" was in reality a motion to 
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reconsider the trial court's ruling on the motion to vacate, which was prohibited under 
Rule 1l(a)(2)(B): 
[] A motion for reconsideration of any order of the trial court made after entry 
of final judgment may be filed within fourteen (14) days from the entry of such 
order; provided, there shall be no motion for reconsideration of an order of 
the trial court entered on any motion filed under Rules 50(a), 52(b), 55(c), 
59(a), 59(e), 59.1, 60(a), or 60(b). 
I.R.C.P. II(a)(2)(B) (Emphasis added) 
Thus, Kirk-Scott's Motion to Amend lacked a reasonable basis in la\v or fact. 
l.R.C.P. 1 1 (a)(1) governs the signing of pleadings and other papers and provides in relevant part: 
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate that the attorney or 
party has read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of the signer's 
knowledge, information, and belief after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded 
in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the 
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed 
for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or 
needless increase in the cost of litigation .. .If a pleading, motion or other paper is 
signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own 
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or 
both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the 
other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred 
because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a 
reasonable attorney's fee. 
I.R.C.P. 11(a)(1) (Emphasis added). 
Whether a motion is sanctionable under I.R.C.P. 11 is determined by assessing the 
knowledge of the relevant facts and law that reasonably could have been acquired at the time the 
document was submitted to the court. See Landvik v. Herbert, 130 Idaho 54, 936 P .2d 697 
(Ct. App. 1997). And whether a court abuses its discretion depends on an analysis of: 
(1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower 
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court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with applicable legal 
standards; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Telford v. 
;'lye, 154 Idaho 606, 610, 301 P.3d 264 (2013). The imposition of Rule 11 sanctions is a 
management tool used to "weed out" misguided filings. Lester v. Salvina, 141 Idaho 937, 940, 
120 P.3d 755 (el. App. 2(05). 
At the hearing on the motion, the court asked counsel for appropriate authority for 
bringing a Rule 59 motion as a basis to reconsider a grant of summary judgment- counsel could 
not cite to such authority. (Tr. Vol. /, pp. 103-104)7 
Here, the trial court certainly recognized this matter was one for the exercise of its 
discretion, and specifically inquired of counsel its basis for filing an apparently improper motion, 
which counsel failed to do. The trial court issued a detailed and reasoned opinion for sanctions 
which should not be disturbed on appeal. 
Given KHD's long history of utilizing this Court to delay Golub's collection efforts, 
coupled with Kirk-Scott's successive filings, sanctions for the time necessary to respond to this 
Motion were warranted and appropriate. 
The authorities Kirk-Scott cites for the first time on appeal are distinguishable, but irrelevant to the trial court's 
exercise of discretion at the time of the sanctions award. 
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G. Attorney fees are not recoverable. 
This action sought declaratory relief on the priority of a judgment lien; the judgment was 
based solely on tort claims. There exists no bias for an award of attorney fees to the prevailing 
party. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's ruling; (1) denying Kirk-Scott's motion to 
vacate; (2) granting Golub's motion for summary judgment; and (3) awarding sanctions should 
be affirmed. 
DATED this _-/,-__ day of April, 2014. 
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